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TERMINATION OF
MEDICAL TREATMENT:
IMMINENT
LEGISLATIVE ISSUES
DENNIS J. HORAN, EsQUIRE*
California passed the first living will legislation in 1976. By current
standards the original California act is now considered moderate to con-
servative, although it seemed very radical at the time.
The California act has set the standards for the thirty-five subse-
quent acts that have been passed and, indeed, was the model for the leg-
islation under consideration right here now, that of the National Confer-
ence of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws.
Such acts are now described by the Legal Advisory Committee for
the Society for the Right to Die as "the first generation of such
legislation."
The next generation of such legislation is typified by the Hemlocks'
Society revised version of the California act. Basically, the Hemlock bill
would be the California act with certain additions. For example, section
7186 would be amended to add "or to request a physician to administer
aid in dying," as an additional fundamental right for California citizens.
That's the nature of the debate at the present time. Two courts, Bar-
ber in California and Conroy in New Jersey, have equated nutrition and
hydration with other medical procedures and have allowed them to be
terminated on the same basis that sophisticated medical procedures such
as respirators are terminated.
The Supreme Court of Massachusetts had the same issue pending
before it right now in the Brophy case. There the trial court refused per-
mission to terminate feeding, finding that nonintrusive feeding methods
that cause no pain and suffering could not be withheld ethically or legally
as long as they continue to be useful.
Since 1976, thirty-five states and the District of Columbia have en-
* Hinshaw, Culbertson, Moelmann, Hoban & Fuller.
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acted living will or natural death statutes which attempt to codify the
well-recognized right to refuse medical treatment. Half of those stat-
utes-nearly all passed since 1983 when it first became an issue-ex-
pressly exclude nutrition and hydration from the life prolonging proce-
dures that may be withdrawn under a living will.
Two of the sixteen enacted prior to that expressly exclude nutrition
and hydration. Four of the seven enacted since 1984 carry out the exclu-
sion. Twelve of the thirteen enacted since 1985 carry the exclusion, thus,
of the twenty such statutes passed in 1984 and 1985, sixteen expressly
exclude nutrition and hydration from the forms of life-prolonging proce-
dures that may be omitted.
This court and legislative activity must be taken into consideration
as very relevant when trying to decide whether or not someone will (a)
support the Commissioner's bill, or (b) support it as amended.
Another problem in this whole debate is the form that the legal de-
bate has taken, that is to say, the living will.
The first steps to codify a solution to the perceived problem used the
will as the solution. What was forgotten, however, was that where there is
no written will concerning the devolution of property, then in all cases
the probate act supplies the answer. There is no statute that provides an
answer to the question when and under what circumstances medical
treatment may be terminated.
In other words, living will legislation is a twenty percent solution, if
we assume that even twenty percent of the population will execute such
wills. What happens to the other eighty percent? Presumably they are
not allowed to die.
For the other eighty percent, medical ethics, morality, case law, cus-
tom and practice, common sense, and good will seem to supply the an-
swer, and they necessarily will supply the answer into the future because
under no circumstances do we foresee an incident where 100 percent of
the people reaching the status of a qualified patient would have executed
such a directive.
How do the National Commissioners on Uniform State Laws supply
the answer? First, the Uniform Rights of the Terminally Ill Act takes the
same basic approach that most states have. Their act is modeled on the
original California act, but there are significant differences which I will
point out.
The Uniform Act allows an individual of sound mind and 18 years of
age to execute a declaration governing the withholding or withdrawal of
life-sustaining treatment when he is no longer able to make such
decisions.
As to the sound mind problem, there is no standard created in the
statute. Presumably it would be the same as existing standards in your
respective states. Section II affords some protection for the health care
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providers because it states that in the absence of knowledge to the con-
trary, a physician or health care provider may presume that a declaration
is valid and still in existence.
The declaration becomes operative when three things occur: when it
has been communicated to the attending physician; and the declarant,
the person who executed the declaration, is determined by the attending
physician to be in a terminal condition; and, thirdly, no longer able to
make decisions regarding the administration of life-sustaining treatment.
When such a declaration becomes operative, that is to say, those con-
ditions have been met, compliance with it is mandatory by the health
care provider. The physician and other health care providers shall act in
accordance with its provisions, and if they cannot, they must comply with
section 7, which allows transfer of the patient.
Section 10(f) says that no physician is required to take any action
contrary to reasonable medical standards. Those two sections (sections 7
and 10) are going to conflict in the future and provide legal problems.
Terminal condition is the most important safeguard in any such leg-
islation for those who oppose the legalization of mercy killing. If you do
not, then you do not worry about it; but if you do, it is a rather significant
public policy line drawing event.
Thus, it is very important how one defines "terminal condition."
Often in the public policy debate those who support this kind of legisla-
tion do so on the hope that they can either minimize the impact of the
definition or handle the definition with a certain amount of vagueness or
looseness so that they can still reach the end they desire.
Of all safeguards in these acts this is the most important: that the
triggering mechanism as to when treatment may be terminated is limited
to the existence of a terminal condition. Consequently, there exists much
pressure to change or loosely define "terminal condition."
For example, the New Jersey Supreme Court, when it allowed the
withdrawal of nutrition in the Conroy case, held that such treatment
could be withdrawn if the person were to die within one year from the
date when this was under consideration, thus looking at terminal condi-
tion as an event that can cover a year's space of time.
The Uniform Act defines terminal condition as an incurable or irre-
versible condition that, without the administration of life-sustaining
treatment, will, in the opinion of the attending physician, result in death
within a relatively short time.
There are four basic problems. What does "within a relatively short
time" mean? When I say to my kids, if you're going out at 9:00 and I tell
them to be back in a relatively short time that could mean anything from
10:00 to 3:00 in the morning.
Problem two, what is the difference between an incurable or irrevers-
ible condition and why is it disjunctive?
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Problem three, what is the significance of defining the condition
without the administration of life-sustaining treatment? Most of the
other acts, as does the California act, define "terminal" to include the
application of life-sustaining procedures. If you are not terminal when the
procedures are applied, then you are not terminal, period, under that
legislation.
As to all of these problems, the Commissioners give a very lengthy
comment, and that comment really sums up the legal debates that have
surrounded these statutes. I recommend it for your reading.
In my opinion, the net effect of the definition of "terminal condition"
used by the Commissioners and as explained in their commentary will do
three things. It will broaden the category of patients who qualify as ter-
minal. It will loosen the medical standards as to the physician's judgment
as to when such patients qualify, that is to say that broader group of
patients may qualify earlier than under many other statutes and certainly
under the cases that have been decided[.
Three, it will create ambiguity whcn applied to patients in a coma or
persistent vegetative state since such patients have both an irreversible
and incurable condition and it seems hat under this Act, section 14, any
medical treatment can be withheld fram them including food and water,
since the argument goes, "they feel no pain, and need neither food nor
comfort care." Nonetheless, even as broad, it is significant and very im-
portant that the termination of medical care be limited to a terminal
state, and this the Act does.
The fourth significant problem: what does "no longer able to make
decisions" mean? Many of the states require legal incompetency. This
does not. The Commissioners, oddly enough, offer no comment on this,
and no definitions in the statute pertaining to this problem.
Is it a legal standard? Is it a medical standard? Is it a common sense
standard? Is it a probate standard? It's fraught with difficulty for a law-
yer who is trying to give advice to a client. The Act is silent also about
the role of the family in giving or withholding consent once the qualified
patient reaches this state. Presumably they have no role in the face of
such an executed directive.
The Act, thus, excludes the family from the decision-making process
once the qualified patient no longer can make a decisions. Qualified pa-
tient is one who is eighteen and has executed the declaration and is in a
terminal condition.
The Act excludes all persons who are able to make such a decision. In
other words, regardless of the fact that a patient has such a document, if
the patient is able to make such decisions, then the document is not in-
volved in the decision-making process; so the Act applies only to those
who cannot make such decisions and again brings up the significance of
that standard. What does it mean and who decides as to when a patient is
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unable to make such a decision? Presumably the physician and the health
care provider do so because they are the ones who have the onus of acting
under the directive.
Now one of the key sections-section 6-says "The Act does not af-
fect the responsibility of physicians to provide treatment, including nutri-
tion and hydration, for a patient's comfort, care or alleviation of pain."
This section is significant because it has the property of being decep-
tive. What does it mean? Under current law, physicians have such a re-
sponsibility according to accepted medical standards, but these standards
are in great debate in the cases, and we will see one day where that comes
out.
That responsibility, in any event, runs beyond just comfort care and
alleviation of pain. Presumably, the Act does not affect nutrition and hy-
dration in those cases which do not involve their use as means of comfort
care or alleviation of pain.
Are there such cases? Yes. The comatose or persistent vegetative
state may be classified as such cases. This will be an area of debate. The
argument will be that a comatose patient or patient in a persistent vege-
tative state is one who does not need nutrition and hydration from com-
fort care or alleviation of pain, and therefore must have nutrition and
hydration omitted pursuant to this declaration under the Act, regardless
of the ethical position of the health care provider. If a physician is in-
volved with the declaration under the Uniform Act, he must follow the
standards of the Act or transfer the patient.
Thus, the Commissioners have taken the position contrary to sixteen
of the twenty acts passed since 1983 which have excluded nutrition and
hydration from the forms of life-prolonging procedures that may be
omitted.
They have attempted to take a more nuanced position, but their po-
sition, nonetheless, is that unless necessary to alleviate pain or provide
comfort care, nutrition and hydration must be omitted under the declara-
tions made pursuant to the Act.
Even in those cases the Act does not mandate the giving of nutrition
and hydration. It allows the physician to exercise his or her discretion
according to his or her medical judgment, whether or not nutrition and
hydration are necessary and will be provided only where relief from paid
for comfort care is at issue.
It allows him no such discretion otherwise. That is to say, where, in
his moral judgment, nutrition and hydration are obligatory to preserve
life even if not needed only or solely to relieve pain or give comfort care,
the physician would be bound to follow the terms of the directive and
omit nutrition and hydration. If some accreditation body said as a matter
of creating medical standards that those patients do not need nutrition
and hydration for comfort care, then he would be deviating from the
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standards of his profession if, in fact, there was such a declaration, he did
not follow it, and he did not refuse to treat the patient.
The Commissioners point out that the only conscience clause availa-
ble to him is transfer under section 7. He then can transfer the patient to
someone else. I suggest it's not altogether practical because who is going
to take the patient under the situation of a problem existing like that?
If he fails to transfer the patient, he's guilty of a misdemeanor. There
is no conscience clause in the Act other than transfer. Immunities in sec-
tion 8 are ambiguous, nor does section 10 supply the answer-transfer is
the only safeguard. A Catholic physician can take the position that com-
fort care and alleviation of pain are medically necessary for a comatose
patient, and, therefore, exercising his discretion, continue to feed. Under
that scenario, our parade of horribles is a nonproblem.
True. That may be a scenario that will solve this situation if such
acts become law. However, the scenario that would make this situation
even more difficult is cost containment. Where, for example, the DRGs
come down with a position that these kinds of patients do not need nutri-
tion and hydration as you indicated, and, therefore, if they have executed
such a declaration, it will not be available to them or you will not be paid
under the DRG.
Of course, to we professional people, not getting paid for providing a
humane service is irrelevant, so maybe it's a nonproblem.
On balance, when one decides whether to support the Act or not be-
cause, even though we may all be Catholics, putting our principles into
place in public policy just does not work; and on deciding whether or not
to support such an Act, one has to take all of these various elements into
consideration.
The nutrition and hydration element is a very significant one because
it continues the process that began in the whole abortion debate, that is
today we find our Catholic medicine being "ghettoized" because we can't
practice medicine the same way everybody else does. We're being pushed
into a corner and maybe that's all right too, because maybe that makes us
stand up and be something and say something on behalf of something.
